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Public Policy and International
Commercial Arbitration:
The Argentine Perspective
Horacio A.

GRIGERA NA6N *

I. " PUBLIC POLICY UNDER ARGENTINE LAW

A.

Distinction between "strict" and "attenuated" Public Poliy Area

Under Argentine Law, public policy is currently considered to be a
synonym of mandatory rules and principles whose application cannot be
avoided by the will of the parties, nor can the latter waive or relinquish in any
way the application of public policy provisions (arts. 18, 19, 21, 872 Argentine

Civil Code, hereinafter referred to as CC).'
Nevertheless, the foregoing statement can be qualified at least in two
ways:
(i) Already at the level of Argentine internal substantive law, one should
distinguish between "strict" and "attenuated" public policy norms. Only the
first category rigorously corresponds to the notion of public policy we have so
far submitted, because though the application of "attenuated" public policy
norms cannot be waived or relinquished by the parties ab initio or at the moment
of contracting, the parties are always individually allowed (and this is the key
difference with "strict" public policy norms) to relinquish any rights or
patrimonial benefits derived therefrom once they have been acquired or have
accrued during or as a result, for instance, of a contractual relationship.
Of course, both "strict" and "attenuated" public policy provisions play a
protective role in response to certain policies, interests and values cherished by
the national community at large. However, the latter, at least at a certain stage,
* Professor of Private International Law at the University of Buenos Aires and at the Museo

Social Argentino University. Attorney and Doctor of Law and Social Sciences (University of

Buenos Aires); LL.M, S.J.D. (Harvard University).
I G. Borda, I Parte General, Tratado de Derecho Civil, n. 45/48; 62/66 (1976).
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is rather aimed at safeguarding individuals from specific dangers menacing
them than at protecting society itself from evils which can be prejudicial to
society as a totality or to any of its significant sectors. This explains why a
violation of "attenuated" public policy provisions can lead to certain specific
effects-for instance, to a relative nullity subject to confirmation by the party
entitled to invoke it-which differ from those arising when a "strict" public
policy norm is infringed (such as the absolute and inescapable nullity for all
2
parties involved of the act contrary to "strict" public policy).
Statute of limitations provisions are a characteristic example of "attenuated" public policy under Argentine law. The parties are prevented from
anticipatedly waiving or modifying statute of limitation provisions or terms but
can freely waive any benefits or defenses acquired under already elapsed statute
of limitations terms. Two different grounds explain this nuanced treatment: a)
at the moment of contracting, the weaker party is more likely to be at the mercy
of compulsory measures or menaces from the party having the stronger
bargaining position for obtaining the waiver of future defenses such as an
eventual invocation of statute of limitation provisions; b) the main purpose of
statute of limitation provisions is to enhance security and certainty in general
societal relationships and particularly in commercial and business transactions
by reducing any possibility of surprising the parties by a belated and unexpected
challenge of contractual relationships. 3 This is a concern clearly connected with
the protection of general societal interests: the stability and predictability of
transactions leading to the development and betterment of commercial and
economic relations and of the general economy of the nation. Nevertheless, the
furtherance of such general values is no longer menaced when in a specific
transaction, one of the parties waives benefits derived from a statute of
limitations which has already elapsed to his advantage.
(ii) According to certain opinions, there is no necessary identity in
Argentine law between public policy norms and imperative norms. A norm is
to be deemed mandatory either because the legislator defines it as such or
because a specific norm or the general legislated area covered in part by it is
considered by the legislator as a public policy one. Therefore, there are
imperative norms which nevertheless cannot be considered public policy ones.4
Norms which owe their imperative character to the specific wishes of the
legislator rather than to their having been labelled as public policy norms are
2 J. Ghestin, Traitd de Drait Civil, Ls Obligations, Le Contrat, n. 778, 667 & fol. (1980).
3 J. Llambias, II Parte General, Tratado de Derecho Civil, n. zxoo, 672 (1978).
4 R. Budano Roig, Itperatividady Orden Phblico, 1i6 El Derecho, n. 6384, 8 & fol., December
13 (1985).
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more likely to be aimed at protecting specific individual situations than at
safeguarding general societal interests. Judges are expected to apply them to the
extent and in the way desired by the legislator.5
B. Public Poliy Norms and Mandatory Norms
However, judges can modify the mandatory nature of norms falling under
the public policy category by denying the public policy nature ascribed to them
by the legislator. In this sense, it has been contended both by Argentine
doctrine and court decisions that it will not suffice that the legislator
dogmatically encompasses a legal norm within the public policy characterization if there is no further underlying societal interest or policy which can be
considered to the eyes of the judge as a public policy one. To this end, the judge
is free to evaluate the nature of the legal provision concerned, the subjectmatter falling under its purview, the reasons or aims pursued by it, the interests
and community values, including common welfare and development concerns,
6
to be protected or advanced by such rules.
In other words, a legal rule not considered by the legislator as a public
policy one can be turned into such by the courts; and vicwersa, the legislative
characterization of public policy norms is not necessarily binding on the courts
if they find that there are no grounds therefore. It is furthermore interesting to
notice that this attitude of Argentine courts is linked to their refusal to accept
broad, abstract and all-encompassing definitions of public policy through
general legal rules. Apparently, Argentine judges feel more inclined to
determine the public policy nature of legal norms on a case-by-case,
issue-by-issue, ad hoc basis by taking into account the societal interests and
policies underlying any such rules in view of the specific subject-matter and
7
dispute at stake.
Though we fully understand that courts should be able within certain
limitations rooted in constitutional law provisions to turn otherwise suppletive
legal rules into mandatory ones as a result of changing public policy notions, we
still feel reluctant to accept that a court is to have more extended powers to
revise the imperative character of legal norms when general societal interests
are concerned than when merely the protection of the individual is affected. The
opposite seems to be much more advisable, specially in a Continental Law
system where it normally corresponds to the legislative bodies to define the
areas of public interest to be particularly protected under the laws and the scope

5J.
6 A.

7

Llambias, I Cddigo Civil Anotado, 54 (1978).
Belluscio, I Cddigo Civily Leyes Complementarias, 1o8 (1979).

1d.,

1o/o9.

Copyright © 2007 by Kluwer Law International. All rights reserved
No claim asserted to original government works

10

JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION

of that protection. An interference by the courts in the role of the legislator in
this respect can be therefore questioned from the angle of its lack of
compatibility with the constitution unless the legislator has exercised his
powers in violation of constitutional guarantees.
On the other hand, only formalistic reasons can explain the strict
categorization between mandatory norms of public policy nature and imperative norms per se. All imperative norms reflect the desire of the legislator of
furthering interests which society wishes to protect; therefore, there is no
reason to introduce discriminatory criteria for establishing their mandatory
effects. In this sense, freedom of contracting and private autonomy themselves
are public policy principles grounded on societal interests wider than those of
any of the parties involved in any particular transaction invoking them. The
same can be said of provisions aimed at protecting weaker parties, which can be
both viewed in terms of social justice and of preventing abuses against one of
the parties in the particular case.8 It does not matter that the effects of the
declaration of nullity of a transaction will vary between cases where the
protection of individuals is more significantly concerned and those where
broader societal or community concerns are involved (in the latter hypothesis,
ratification of the act attacked on nullity grounds, available to the party
protected by nullity provisions in the former case where the attacked act is
merely voidable, is not allowed); such difference in treatment does not suffice
for conferring broader powers on the judge for deciding on the mandatory
effects*of legal rules which irrespective of the characterization made by the
legislator, were intended to be imperatively observed by both the individuals
and the courts.
For us, then, all imperative laws and principles are public policy norms,
and viceversa, all that is characterized either by the judge or the legislator as
belonging to the sphere of public policy is to be mandatorily enforced. In
consequence, whatever external forms have been chosen for imposing the
planning principle 9 over the will of the individuals, they all require identical
allegiance.
In our opinion, the Argentine judge is both entitled to (a) within certain
constitutional law limits, allocate public policy nature to legal norms not
originally qualified as such or not invested with imperative effects by the
legislator, 10 but not to deprive of mandatory nature legal norms which have
8 J. Liambias, I Parte General, Tratado de Derecho Civil, n. 188,

16o (1978).

9 A. T. von Mehren, A general view of Contract, Ch. i, VII International Engedopedia of
Comparative Law, io & fol. (1982).
10J. Ghestin, L'ordre public, notion i contenu variable en droitfranfais, Les Notions a Contenu
Variable en Droit, 78/SI (1984), clearly shows that this is a necessary outcome of the continuous
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been labelled by the legislator as public policy ones without any violation of
constitutional guarantees; and (b) to pronounce himself on the sphere of
application of public policy and imperative norms, thereby indirectly affecting
their imperative scope by including in or excluding from their range specific
legal relationships.
The operation referred to at (b) would fall within the constitutional
powers of judges of interpreting and applying the law in face of the particular
controverted issue at stake, by taking into account the purpose of legal
provisions and the interests and policies underlying them, as well as the more
general legal principles-themselves reflecting wider interests and policies-pertaining to the whole juristic system or to the specific legal area affected
by the dispute. 11 As a consequence, the already criticized apparently excessive
powers exercised by Argentine judges for denying public policy nature granted
by the legislator to specific legal norms become perfectly valid and appropriate
when aimed at defining the area of application of public policy norms, and in
our view, of imperative or mandatory norms at large. Therefore, the scope of
application of such norms is determined rather by taking into account the
particularities of the specific case than by blindly abiding by abstract and
generally defined notions of public policy deemed to apply a priori to a
generality of future and unknown cases. 12 As we will further see, this functional
way of looking at public policy and imperative norms within strictly local cases
has a direct influence on the extraterritorial notion and effects of public policy in
the international arena.

II.

INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC POLICY IN ARGENTINE PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL
LAW

A.

Traditional Notion

Following the general tradition in the field, Argentine private international law contemplates the absolute exclusion of foreign substantive law and
legal principles contradictory with Argentine international public policy
though their application be designated-even imperatively-by Argentine
conflict-of-law rules (art. 14 (2) CC).
evolution and fluctuations of public policy notions, whose changes can be captured either by the
legislator or the judge.
It See court decisions in this sense at Llambias, supra note 4, at 42/45.
12 See, for instance, National Commercial Court of Appeals "C", Domigo Luis v. Kaiser
Alaminio S.A., 139 La Ley, 8go/8o2 (1970).
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Argentine international public policy taken in its strict sense embodies
both i) general principles of morality and justice on which the Argentine
society is grounded or accepted by the Argentine society; ii) essential principles
underlying the Argentine juristic system; iii) essential principles of economic
and social public policy safeguarding certain aspects of (a) the protection of the
individual participating in economic or labor transactions (ordre public de
protection)and (b) the economic and social structure of the country as well as of
13
the furtherance of national policies in this area (ordre public de direction).
Argentine international public policy is also deemed to incorporate public
international law principles and ius cogens in the measure that they have been or
14
must be deemed incorporated into Argentine law.

B.

Public Policy "Lois de Police" and Laws of Immediate Application

Though not identical with the notion of international public policy, but
still close to it because having a bearing on the amount of foreign law an
Argentine court will be ready to apply when it is to decide an international

dispute, is the growing literature and court decisions in Argentina favoring the
unilateral application of originally local or municipal substantive norms to
international cases.15 This will happen, according to our views, when interest
and policies underlying a specific substantive rule or principle or evidenced
through them would be frustrated if any such rule did receive international
application. The latter will not therefore depend on the traditional conflictof-laws "hard-and-fast" technique of determining the applicable law through
the localization of the different connecting factors individually ascribed to the
diverse abstract categories where all legal relationships are to be necessarily and
respectively inserted: on the contrary, the area of application of each
substantive legal rule is to be determined by considering the strength of the
interests and policies underlying it in light of the controverted issue and of the
13Ghestin, supra, note z, 86 & fol.; 89 & fol.
14R. Vinuesa, G. Moncayo, H. Gutiirrez Posse, r Derecho Internacional PJblico, 58/7 ;
F. Rigaux, Les notions J contenu variable en DroitInternationalPrivi, L s Notions h Contemn Variable en
Droit, 240/241 (1984).
15I. Winizky & H. Grigera Na6n, El art. 3o del Dto./Ley s9.yyo y la actacidn internacionalde las
sociedades comerciaks en el anibito de los Tratados de Montevideo de z889y y40, 38 Revista del Derecho
Comercial y de las Obligaciones, 133 & fol. (1974); H. Grigera Na6n, Les riglesdedroit limitant lear
propre dowaine d'application:doctrine comparie et droit argentin; Rechtsvergleichng, Eroparecht and
Staatenintegration,Gedchtnisscbriftfir Leontin Constantinesco, 185 & fol. (i983); A. Boggiano, r
Derecho InternacionalPrivado, 313 & fol. (1983); on the relevance of the issue-by-issue and policy
analysis in international contract law, see D. T. Trautman, Some notes on the theory of
choice-of-law clauses, 35 Mercer L. Rev., 13 5 (1984).
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connections of the latter with the legal order to which such rule belongs. It is the
interaction of all these elements: interests, policies, disputed issue and contacts
"creating interests" which is to determine if a loi de police exists and is to be
16
applied or not.
The loi de police technique differs from the traditional international public
policy notion because (i) the policies determining the extraterritorial application of otherwise municipal substantive rules do not respond to general
principles abstracted from the whole of the legal system or societal organization
or to broad conceptions of morality and justice, but reflect concrete and specific
interests and policies which account for the existence of that norm in the legal
order or correspond to the field of law to which that norm belongs and (ii) loisde
police do not seek to exceptionally avoid the otherwise normal application of
foreign law, but once their conditions of application are given, they
immediately apply to the issue at stake, thereby ab initio (a) excluding both the
eventual application of foreign laws and of any "indirect" conflict-of-law rules
of the legal order to which they belong and (b) simultaneously superseding any
choice-of-law made by the parties which would deny application to the loi de
police concerned.
Very close to lois depolice are rules of immediate application. The latter are
substantive rules whose ab initio principal purpose is to directly apply to
international transactions pursuant to specific policies established by the
legislator.17 Therefore, unlike loisdepolice, laws of immediate application are not
originally local or municipal rules of law which on account of the specific issue
at stake require extraterritorial application. Normally, laws of immediate
application share the strict mandatory character of lois de police and their
application cannot be prevented by a contrary choice of law of the parties.
Moreover, like lois de police, they usually unilaterally and directly govern legal
relationships falling within their scope without resorting to the "indirect" or
"conflictual" choice-of-law technique; nevertheless, this last aspect is not so
clear in certain cases: for instance, art. 14 sec. 4 CC provides that the application
of Argentine law is privileged if it conflicts with a foreign law less favorable to
the validity of juristic acts, which might suggest that primarily, the applicable
law to the transaction is to be determined according to the general "conflictual"
choice-of-law method, and only thereafter the application of the foreign
substantive law so designated is to be left aside if less favorable than Argentine
law to the validity of juristic acts beause the latter is to necessarily prevail
pursuant to a substantive legislative policy favoring the validity of international
1

6 Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S., 302, 313, S.Ct. 633 (1981).
17P. Mayer, Droit InternationalPrivd, n. 132, 110/111 (1983).
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transactions with some contact with Argentina. In cases like this, the "direct"
method embodied in laws of immediate application only seems to play a role
once the otherwise normally applicable law has been established through the
traditional conflictual or "indirect" method.18
Any sort of internal substantive public policy rule depicted at Chapter
I-"strict" or "attenuated"-can become a loi de police as a result of its
underlying policies and the issue at stake, probably without altering their
original functional properties. Thus, it is most likely that a loi de police
corresponding to an "attenuated" public policy internal norm will allow the
beneficiary of any advantage thereunder to an ex postfacto relinquishment of
rights or benefits which have been already acquired therefrom.
The loi de police technique is generally contemplated at art. 14 (1) CC
privileging the application of Argentine public law norms over the application
of foreign law and art. I zo6 CC determining the direct application of Argentine
substantive laws to international contracts when so required by the interests of
the State or of its inhabitants.
It is true that the notions of public laws and of lois de police do not
necessarily overlap.. In fact, an authorized current of opinion has recently
contended that the extraterritorial application of public laws implicating the
State as a public law subject or the exercise of sovereign powers pertaining to
the State's "self-organization" is not determined by private international law
but is governed by public international law.1 9 On the other hand, these opinions
also maintain that a number of norms characterized as public law rules are
actually "decisions" (most of nationalization provisions would fall under this
category) deprived of general and abstract effects, whose creation does not
bring about a modification of the legal order so that their area of influence does
not exceed the concrete situation to which they are addressed and can only be
repealed with retroactive effects. 20 The determination of the extraterritorial
effects of decisions would also be excluded from the purview of lois depolice and
conflict-of-laws. It would be based instead on an analysis similar to that leading
to that leading to the extraterritorial recognition and enforcement of foreign
judgments, so that considerations concerning the existence of jurisdiction and
competence of the foreign authority or organ issuing the decision and the
latter's compatibility with the international public policy of the forum as well as
18H. Grigera Na6n, supra note 14, at 204/405.
19 p. Mayer, La distinction entre rigles et dicisions en DroitInternationalPrivi(973); H. Grigera
Na6n, Foreign Acts of State before National Courts, InternationalLaw and Municipal Law (Bothe &

Vinuesa, Gen. Eds.), 51 & fol. (1982).
2DMayer, id. at 48 & fol. ; Grigera Na6n, id. at 15.
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public international law considerations will be finally decisive in this
respect.21
It is too premature yet to pretend that these opinions have been echoed by
Argentine doctrine and court decisions. Nevertheless, art. 14 (1) CC does not
seem to close the door to such ideas and, in any case, though such conceptions
be rejected, it certainly authorizes the direct and immediate extraterritorial
application of Argentine public laws if they can still be considered on account of
their underlying policies and interests as lois de police growingly accepted by
Argentine doctrine and court decisions or if they can be deemed to be legal rules
of immediate application.
C.

Public Policy and "Fraude d la Loi" in Argentine Private InternationalLaw

Argentine law (like the law of the Federal Republic of Germany) 22 also
encompasses within its broad notion of international public policy-clearly
exceeding the "strict" notion which we have previously considered-thefraude
dla loi doctrine. Fraude la loi in the private international law sense refers to any
manoruvres addressed at frustrating the application of the law which should
normally apply if the private international law system of the forum operated
without any artificially created distortions.
To this notion respond arts. 1 z07 and izo8 CC providing that (i) any
contract concluded abroad for evading otherwise applicable Argentine
mandatory law or (ii) any contract made in Argentina for evading the
application of foreign mandatory law will be rendered null and void. Thus, by
condemning both fraude d la loi propre etfraude J la loi itrangire the Argentine
legislator underscores the imperative character of the Argentine private
international law and the necessary application, even ex officio, of national or
foreign mandatory laws designated by the Argentine private international law.
Such imperative nature of Argentine private international law becomes then a
part of Argentine principles of public policy in the international sense and leads
to the ex officio application by an Argentine judge of foreign laws designated
through Argentine private international law choice-of-law methodologies.
The fraude 4 la loi doctrine in Argentine law has a role to play both with
regard to (a) the "conflictual" indirect choice-of-law technique and (b) the
direct loi de police and "legal rules of immediate application" technique
belonging to Argentine private international law.

21 Mayer,

id. at 74 & fol.

22 B. Dickson, The Reform of Private International Law in Germany, 34 I.C.L.Q., 242
(985).
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A good example to illustrate howfraude d la Ioi works as to (a) is to be found
in the field of choice-of-law for international contracts.
Though there is no reference whatsoever to private autonomy at arts.
zo 5/lzx4 CC concerning the law applicable to international contracts,
Argentine doctrine seems to concur in that the parties are allowed to choose the
applicable law. It remains however to see which are the limits to the freedom of
the parties in this respect.
As a matter of fact, arts. 120 5/,14

CC only refer to two main connecting

factors: the place where the contract has been concluded (art. i zo5 CC) and the
place where the contract has been or is to be performed (arts. i ,o9/1 ±14 CC).
For some opinions, these provisions only play a suppletive role when the parties
have not made any explicit or tacit choice-of-law.2 3 How are these two
incompatible connecting factors to be then reconciled? Art. 12o5 CC would
only apply to contracts concluded out of Argentina not having any relevant
contact with the Argentine legal order either (i) because they have been
concluded and are to be performed abroad but on account of a fortuitous
circumstance originate an action which has been filed with an Argentine court
or (ii) because though the parties did not specifically designate any place of
performance, fortuitous circumstances lead any of them to seek contractual
24
performance in Argentina.
Other opinions-which we tend to prefer-deny all effects to the place of
contractual conclusion when that place and the place of contractual performance coincide, a solution coherent with the source of this provision, Story's
Conflict-of-Laws.2 5 Only when the place of performance at least in part takes
place outside of the place of contractual conclusion and a predominant place of
performance cannot be determined, not even by subsidiarily referring
according to arts. Iz Iz/x z 13 CC to the domicile of the debtor who is sued under
the contract or according to art. z 14 CC (in the case of contracts inter absentes)
to the respective domicile of the parties, it is then subsidiarily allowed to resort
to the contractual place of conclusion for establishing the applicable law.
In our view, then, the place of contractual performance will normally
designate in most cases the applicable law. However, we do not believe that
arts. 1205/1214 CC apply subsidiarily when there has been no exercise of the
23For a description and critical evaluation of these positions, see H. Grigera Na6n,
InternationalContractLaw, "lois de police" and sef-applicatingrules: an Argentine outlook, io Vortrige,
Reden und Berihte as dem EuropaInstitut, Universitatdes Saarlandes,(1983); by the same author, Les
Contrats Internationaux en Argentine, 7 D.P.C.I., 4z7 & fol. (1981).
24A. Belluscio (J. C. Smith), ; C6digo Civily Lejes Complementarias, ioig, ioz5 (1984).
25 V. Romero del Prado, I Derecho InternacionalPrivado, 628 (1961); J. Story, Commentarieson
the Conflict of Lanws, 3z5 (5883).
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private autonomy of the parties for choosing the proper law because there is no
indication whatsoever in that sense in such provisions or in the footnotes
inserted at the bottom by the author of the Argentine civil code himself. It only
remains then to accept that such provisions apply even when there has been a
choice-of-law operated by the parties; therefore, the mandatory or public policy
norms of the contractual place of performance will trace the boundaries within
which the substantive rules of law of the legal order chosen by the parties will be
allowed to govern their contract and contractual effects derived therefrom.
Nevertheless, in order to assess the true scope of the controlling power of
the place of contractual performance over the chosen law it is necessary to
clarify what should be understood byplace ofperformance and by mandatory rules
of the law of the place of performance.
As far as the meaning of place of performance is concerned, necessary
reference is to be made to the sources of arts. 1z09/1214 CC, the works of the
German Savigny and of the Brazilian Teixeira de Freitas. Both understand that
for determining the applicable law to any legal relationship, its Sitt or sihge, or in
other words, it' center of gravity, is to be determined. International contracts
are not an exception to this. For the German Savigny, there is no applicable law
to the contract as a whole but each contractual obligation is to be separately
governed by its own law. For determining the applicable law, it is then needed
to identify the separate Sitq of each obligation, which coincides with its place of
performance. It is then the localization of each obligation's place of
performance which indicates its applicable law. 26 The Brazilian Freitas goes a
step further and speaks in terms of the place of performance of the contract as
27
the center of gravity for determining the law governing contractual effects.
Velez Sarsfield, the author of the Argentine Civil Code, also refers to the
contractual place of performance as the center of gravity for determining the
applicable law to all contractual aspects but for formal validity and capacity to
contract (the latter are in principle respectively governed by the law where the
contract is made (art. i 2 CC.) and by the domicile of the contracting parties
(arts. 6 and 7 CC).
However, contracts do not have any place of performance; one could at
most refer to specific contractual obligations having their corresponding places
of performance' and even assuming (as Freitas seems to do) that the contractual
place of performance coincides with the place of performance of contractual
obligations emerging from it, it is far from unusual to see that different or the
26 F. C. v. Savigny, A treatise on the conflict of laws, f. 36, R4 & fol., Edinburgh (Aflo).

27 A. T. Freitas, Codigo Civil, art. 196z, at 656 (Ed. Roldin,
785, (Rio de Janeiro, Laemnmert, x865).

19o9);

III Codigo Civil(Esboo),
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same contractual obligations are performed in different places so that it
becomes impossible to determine (unless an aprioristic determination of a
characteristic obligation and its corresponding place of performance is made) 28
which is the "contractual" proper law. There is furthermore a logical
impossibility to follow this approach, because normally, it is the law applicable
to the contract as a whole wich allows us to learn which are the contractual
effects arising therefrom, including the contractual obligations to which it gives
birth. We would be putting the cart before the horse if we tried to determine the
applicable law to the conctract by referring prima facie to the place of
performance of each such obligations for finding out, for instance, the
applicable law determining if the contract exists or is valid as source of such
obligations and the qualities and scope of the latter.
Actually, the expression "place of contractual performance" is deprived of
specific semantic reference because there is no such thing as a place where
contracts are performed and, moreover, a contract is a source of obligations and
an organizational framework of different obligational aspects which is
something more than the obligations which it creates and coordinates. 29
Therefore, the contract is to have a "place of performance" or center of gravity
of its own which can or cannot coincide, according to the circumstances, with
the place of performance of contractual obligations. The contractual place of
performance cannot be therefore fixed in abstractoand for all cases; it is a notion
h contenu variable 30 to be established on an ad-hoc, case-by-case basis corresponding to each different contractual situation.
In contemporary comparative law, this has been achieved by determining
the center of gravity of contractual relationships through the grouping of
contacts technique, that is, by submitting an international contract to the legal
order with which it is most closely connected because it shows more--or at least
the most relevant-contacts with the transaction. 31 Normally, a hierarchy in the
relevance of the diverse contacts jointly grouped for determining the applicable
law (place of performance, place of conclusion, domicile and nationality of the
parties, choice offorum or arbitral clauses, inter a/ia)is established aprioriby the
2 Jessurun d'Oliveira, CharacteristicObligationin the Draft EEC Convention, z5 Am.J. Cox.
L., 303 & fol. (1977); F. Juenger, The EEC Convention on the Law Applicable to contractual obligations,
Contract Conflicts, North Ed., at 300/302 (x98z). The European 198o Convention itself makes clear
that characteristic obligations are just rebuttable presumptions for the contractual closest
connection (art. 4).
2 Grigera Na6n, supra. id. notes 14 & 22.
30 Rigaux, supra note 13, at. 241.
31 For the U.S.A. situation, Scoles & Hay, Conflict of Laws, 65z & fol. (1982). For the U.K.,
see Cheshire & North, Private InternationalLaw, zx8 & fol. (1979).
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legislator or ad-hoc by the judge, so that not all contacts have identical weight in
designating the contractual SitZ.32
D. International Contracts and InternationalMandatory Rules in Argentina
It is in this way, then, that the expression "place of performance" in
arts. 1209 and fol. CC is to be understood; it will be the contractual localization
determined ad-hoc by the judge for each contractual relationship through the
grouping of contacts process that will enable to establish the contractual
applicable law. Only in the very unlikely hypotheses where it will be impossible
to determine where the contacts predominantly group themselves will the judge
resort to subsidiary "fixed" and "hard and fast" connecting factors individually
operating the designation of the applicable law, such as the domicile of the
debtor and the place of contractual conclusion (arts. 1205, izi2/1214 CC),
though it is to be remarked that at this stage there must already have played a
role as contacts in the preliminary (and most probably successful and final) step
of the grouping process leading to the ad-hoc determination of the "place of
33
performance".
Nevertheless, the determination of the localization of an international
contract through the grouping of contacts procedure is not to necessarily lead
under Argentine law to the application of all the substantive rules of the legal
order so designated. If such legal order is the Argentine one, for instance,
substantive suppletive rules will not govern if their application has been
directly set aside by the parties or has indirectly been excluded through their
choice of a different and incompatible law. According to certain opinions to
which we have already referred, the same would happen to legal rules owing
their imperative character to their characterization as local public policy norms
in the measure that the judge deciding the international case submitted to him
will determine ad-hoc that the underlying. policies and the issue at stake do not
authorize to grant imperative character to a legal norm because there are no
(internal) public policy reasons allowing such result.
Those who do not accept such solution will still acknowledge the
authority of judges to determine through the interpretation process the scope of
applicability of imperative substantive rules at large. As a result, the mere
designation of the Argentine legal order as a whole by the contractual
localization through grouping of contacts only determines the prima facie
predominant relevance of the Argentine national substantive legal order for
32 H. Batiffol & P. Lagarde, II Droit International Privi, q.

88 & fol., 29o & fol.

(1983).
33 Grigera Na6n, supra. id. note 22.
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regulating the totality of the contractual relationship at stake, but does not
necessarily imply the extraterritorial relevance of all and every substantive rule
of such order for governing the specifically controverted issue in the instant
case.
It is then up to the judge to decide in face of each controverted issue if the
policies and interests of the otherwise strictly local substantive norms indicated
by the contractual localization ("place of performance") and the widerforum's
interests and policies implicated by international transactions and international
commerce make the latter "wish" to receive extraterritorial application despite
their originally exclusive relevance for entirely local transactions. The initial
presumption will be that the imperative substantive rules of the "place of
performance" apply to international cases and limit choice-of-law autonomy.
But such presumption can be rebutted by showing that in face of the concrete
dispute to be decided there are no interests and policies requiring the
extraterritorial application of originally entirely locally-oriented substantive
norms. The "place of performance" as connecting factor acquires then a
functional meaning according to which contacts, substantive legal rules of the
concernedforum and underlying or relevantforum policies continuously interact
much in the way they do under functional and interest analysis characteristic of
U.S.A. conflict-of-laws doctrines. 34
The utilization by the Argentine judge of functional choice-of-law
techniques for determining the best and more fair and just ad-hoc choice-of-law
solution for the particular case has become more likely after the ratification by
Argentina of the Inter-American Convention on General Rules of Private International Law, whose article 9 textually provides the following:
"The different laws that may be applicable to various aspects of one and the
same juridical relationship shall be applied harmoniously in order to attain the
purposespursuedby each of such laws. Any difficulties that may be caused by this
simultaneous application shall be resolved in the light of the requirementsofjustice in
each specific case." 35
Thus, the notions of issue-by-issue analysis or "depecage" and of policies
underlying the substantive rules at stake, as well as the concern for finding the
most just solution for each dispute are contemplated by this provision.
As a consequence, the Argentine judge is to be deemed able to limit the
scope of application of municipal mandatory norms of only parochial
significance even if the legal system to which such norms belong is designated
34

Id.; Trautman, supra. id. note

35

See OAS Serie sobre Tratados n. 54, OEA/Ser. A/3i (SEPF), I & fol. (1979); Argentine

14; Scoles & Hay, smpra. id. note 30.

ratification took place through law z2.9z

of 1983.
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by the contractual "place of performance". If the parties have chosen the
application of a different legal order incompatible with such norms, nofrauded
la loi can ensue because the judge will have decided that the latter, though
imperative, do not apply to the international case at stake. If, on the contrary,
the subject-matter of the dispute and the interests and policies concerned
(underlying the relevant substantive rules and the general field of law affected)
indicate that such rules require their extraterritorial application in view of the
need of reaching the just solution required by each particular case, then, all and
every choices-of-law of the parties preventing their application is to be deemed
objectively fraudulent in terms of arts. i zo8/i 2o9 CC and is to be left aside by
the competent court as far as the solution of the controverted issue is
concerned.36
If we turn now to (b)-the application of thefrauded la loi doctrine and lois de
police or legal rules of immediate application-we are facing a different
theoretical and practical context. A loi de police or legal rule of immediate
application (hereinafter jointly referred to as "direct rules") applies to an
international case ignoring any "conflictual" choice-of-law procedures. As a
result, the judge does not investigate first if the direct rule belongs or not to the
legal order corresponding to the "place of performance" established through
the grouping of contacts method: he only looks at the substantive norm itself,
the issue at stake and the underlying interests and policies concerned. If the
conditions of application of the direct rule are given, the judge will
automatically apply it whatever the "place of performance" determined
through the grouping of contacts method will be; if such conditions fail to
exist, the direct rule will not apply even if the legal order to which it belongs is
designated through the grouping of contacts process.
Therefore, nofraude d la loi is conceivable if the judge of the legal order to
which the direct rule belongs is called to decide the case. Such judge will not
even consider the choice-of-law made by the parties or the contractual
localization: he will automatically apply his direct rule to the controverted
issue. If there is any possiblefrauded la loi to the direct rule of the judge, it can be
only achieved through a choice offorum, foreign or arbitral. 37 Courts of the legal
order to which direct rules belong often claim exclusive jurisdiction on any
controverted issues to which direct rules become applicable. Therefore, any
choice-of-forum or arbitral clause granting jurisdiction to adjudicators who
will deny the application of the direct rules of the excluded Argentineforum will
3 Grigera Na6n, supra. id. note 2z.
37 This is what is known as fraude oujugement, Mayer, supra note 16, 379 & fol.; 317 &
fol.
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be ineffective and fraudulent in terms of art. izo7 CC and as the exclusive
jurisdiction of Argentine courts has been evaded (art. i National Code of Civil
and Commercial Procedure, hereinafter Cpr.), 38 the decisions or awards of the
chosenfora will not be recognized or enforced by Argentine courts (arts. 517,
5 19 bis Cpr.).

On the other hand, under art. I zo8 CC, an Argentine court will not lend
itself to a fraudulent evasion of a foreign direct rule not contradictory with an
Argentine direct rule or with Argentine international public policy. 39 In
principle, then, an Argentine court is expected to apply foreign direct rules
when their conditions of application under the laws of their country of origin
are given though such application was sought to be evaded through the choice
of the Argentine forum or of a third forum (this latter can happen when
enforcement of the thirdforum's decision or award is sought in Argentina) or
through the exercise of the parties' private autonomy for choosing the
application law.

III.

PUBLIC POLICY AND

INTERNATIONAL

COMMERCIAL

ARBITRATION:

AN

ARGENTINE VIEW

This topic is to be analyzed with regard to three different aspects:
(i) public policy and arbitral proceedings or awards taking place or
rendered in Argentina with regard to an international transaction;
(ii) public policy and invocation of an arbitral agreement regarding an
international transaction before Argentine courts for compelling arbitration or
for obtaining a stay of court proceedings in Argentina;
(iii) public policy and recognition or enforcement of foreign arbitral
awards in Argentina.
(i) Arbitral proceedings and awards in Argentina have to be compatible
with essential principles of fairness and justice which are a part of both
Argentine internal and international public policy. 40 For instance, the due
process guarantee embodied in article 18 of the Argentine Constitution requires

3s H. Grigera Na6n, Report on Argentina, InternationalHandbook on Commercial Arbitration,P.
Sanders General Editor. Supplement III, i & fol. (1985).
39
Mayer, supra, note x6, n. i,8 & fol., io6 & fol.
40 Grigera Na6n, supra note 36, at 25 & fol.
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that every party to a controversy to be adjudicated have a fair opportunity to be
heard and state his or her case.
Arbitral proceedings-national or international-fall within the scope of
this public policy provision. With regard to de lure arbitration-in the course of
which arbitrators are expected to strictly abide by the applicable rules of law
governing both the substance of the dispute and the arbitral proceedings
themselves-failure to meet this standard, or the fact that the arbitrator has
incurred in "essential procedural error" can lead to the setting aside of the
award. The same will happen if the award has been made after the deadline
established therefore at the terms of reference or if it falls on issues not
submitted to arbitration (art. 76o (z) Cpr.).
Arbitral proceedings where arbitrators have ex aequo at bono adjudicating
powers (amigables componedores) also have to comply with due process
constitutional requirements. Their awards can be also set aside if rendered after
expiration of the agreed term or when they decide issues not submitted to
arbitration (art. 771 Cpr.).
There also are additional grounds pertaining to general public policy
reasons for challenging both de iure and ex aequo et bono awards rendered in
Argentina in international cases:
i) Matters which cannot be freely settled or compromised by agreement of
the parties cannot be submitted to arbitration (art. 737 Cpr.).
This provision basically refers to two hypotheses:
a) matters which on account of public policy reasons are deemed
non-arbitrable (certain aspects of foreign investment law, antitrust and patent
legislation, legal capacity of persons and family law, inter alia);
b) matters where there is exclusive jurisdiction of Argentine courts
(matters where the Argentine State is a party and where, in addition, federal
laws or provisions of the Argentine Constitution are applicable (art. ioo CN);
questions where the exercice of sovereign powers of the State, such as the
exercise of its taxing powers or the attribution or denial of nationality to
41
individuals, are directly implicated).
In all such cases, no arbitration-local or international-will be
allowed.
Nevertheless, it is conceivable in the light of our considerations on public
policy in the previous Chapters, that if an international arbitration takes place in
Argentina, internal imperative or public policy norms will not necessarily apply
even to the eyes of an Argentine judge called to decide on the setting aside of the
41 Grigera Na6n, supranote 36, at 3; H. Grigera Na6n & J. Samtleben, Scbiekdgeriehtsbarrkeit
in Argentinien, xo RIW. 728 (1983).
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award. 42 Thus, matters which cannot be arbitrated in entirely local settings
might become arbitrable in international ones.
However, concerns of national protection in certain vital aspects of
Argentine economy related to international commercial and economic intercourse can also validly lead to exactly the opposite outcome and render for
instance, and precisely because the controversy is an international one,
non-arbitrable outside of Argentina matters which can be normally arbitrated in
the Argentine territory.
z) International cases to be deemed generally arbitrable under Argentine
law, but where the substance of the award goes against Argentine international
public policy.
In general, it is unlikely that an Argentine judge will question the
substance of the arbitral award or the results attained by the choice-of-law made
by the arbitrators or the parties to the arbitrated dispute unless there is evidence
(at least when the dispute arises from an international contract) that the award
leads to a) a violation of general principles of morality and justice or of basic
grounds of the Argentine juristic system, society and economic structure and
policies; or b) a violation of foreign mandatory laws which should receive
application both on account of Argentine private international law ("place of
performance") and of the interests and policies underlying such laws (fraude i la
loi itrangire);or c) a violation of Argentine mandatory laws of the Argentine
"place of performance" imperatively wishing to receive international application (fraude i la loipropre); or d) a violation of Argentine or foreign direct rules
also requiring extraterritorial application.
All these hypotheses are really different examples of violation of Argentine
international public policy in the broad sense defined in the previous Chapter
which might lead an Argentine judge to set aside arbitral awards rendered in
Argentina when the controversy is originated in an international contract.
It is also to be borne in mind that the foregoing concerning arbitrability of
disputes and operation of international public policy in connection with
international commercial arbitration will not at all necessarily imply an abusive
interference of Argentine judges in arbitrations held in Argentina because, as
already pointed out, the interests and policies to be evaluated within the
framework of entirely local transactions do not wholly coincide with those
considered when international transactions are at stake. In this latter context,
general concerns of predictability, fairness, fostering of internatrional commercial and economic intercourse, reciprocity, harmony, lowering of costs,
42

H. Grigera Na6n. El arbitrajeroercialen Amirica Latina, 4 Revista del Dereeha Idustrial,
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unification of international trade law, functional coordination of mandatory
norms of national origin governing international trade and economic transactions and swiftness of international economic and international transactions are
to be analyzed on the same footing of specific interests and policies underlying
each national mandatory substantive norms.4 3 Thus, the application of a norm
preventing the arbitrability of certain disputes in local settings, or the
application of mandatory prohibitive norms for totally local transactions is not
necessarily warranted in international cases when after weighing together the
interests and policies underlying such provisions for entirely local cases and
those pertaining to international ones it is concluded that the specificity of the
international issue at stake constrains the applicability of the mandatory rule
only to local transactions.
(ii) What has been generally said in (i) is also true when the validity of an
arbitral clause concerning an international transaction is invoked. Nevertheless,
in such instances, the invalidity of the arbitral clause is rather more likely to
ensue because there is a public policy reason relevant for arbitrations in an
international setting specifically forbidding arbitration in the instant
case-probably expressed through lois de police concretely excluding international or "foreign" arbitration-than because there is a possible violation of
Argentine international public policy if an arbitration were carried out under
such arbitral clause.
The reason for this is that it will be very difficult-and most often
impossible-to determine before the arbitration has even started if it will lead to
a solution incompatible with Argentine international public policy as previously described in this paper (either as a violation of general principles of
morality, justice and social or economic organization or of the fundamental
mechanisms for the designation of the applicable law on which the Argentine
private international law system is grounded); or that future arbitral
proceedings pursuant to the questioned arbitral agreement will be carried in a
way incompatible with Argentine international public policy. Only if such
incompatibility appears from the arbitral clause itself or from the instructions
given to the arbitrators, or from other circumstances evidenced by the contract
where the arbitral clause is inserted, (such as the choice-of-law provisions to be
applied by the arbitrator according to the will of the parties), can an Argentine
judge deny validity and effects to an arbitral clause corresponding to an
international transaction as contrary to Argentine international public policy.
43 A. T. von Mehren. Choice-of-Law and the Probkm ofjmstice. 41 Law & Contemp. Probs., 2 &
foL (1977).
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It is also relevant to point out that the average opinion of Argentine
authors and court decisions do not seem to grant absolute independence to the
arbitral clause from the contract where it has been inserted. Moreover, it
appears to be settled that issues of inexistence of the contract containing the
arbitral clause and of contractual invalidity necessarily reaching the arbitral
clause cannot be settled through arbitration under such clause and are to be
decided by national courts. 44 For this reason, there is no contrary evidence that
an Argentine court will not consider the application of mandatory legal norms
wishing to receive extraterritorial application belonging to the "place of
performance" of the transaction submitted to arbitration for determining the
validity and effects of the arbitral clause itself, as well as relevant direct rules of
its own and foreign "interested" fora.
(iii) Arbitral awards rendered outside of Argentina will not be recognized
or enforced in the country if they run against Argentine "principles of public
policy" or if they decide issues which cannot be arbitrated or if the arbitral
agreement covers an issue submitted to the exclusive jurisdiction of Argentine
courts (arts. 517 (4), 5 19 bis, 737 and i Cpr.).
In general terms, the requirements for recognition and enforcement of
foreign arbitral awards rendered in international commercial disputes are based
on the same public policy and arbitrability limitations already described with
regard to the powers of judges to set aside arbitral awards rendered in
Argentina or to the possibility of denying recognition or validity to arbitral
clauses when international commercial or economic disputes have been
submitted to arbitration.
Therefore, recognition and enforcement of foreign arbitral awards
violating Argentine general principles of morality and justice or Argentine
social, economic and political organization and policies, or Argentine or
foreign relevant direct rules, or within the framework of international
contracts, substantive mandatoy norms of the "place of performance" wishing
to receive international or extraterritorial application to the controverted issue
(fraude d la loi) may be refused by Argentine courts.
Nevertheless, it is to be remarked that the recognition and enforcement of
foreign arbitral awards bring to bear specific policies and interests which will
certainly have a moderating impact on the evaluation of the intensity to be
given to the policies of the forum requiring the refusal of recognition or
enforcement of a foreign award which has been issued in connection with a
truly international case.
44

Grigera Na6n, supra note 39 at 726: note 36, at ix.
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In this sense, there are general policies normally shared by the procedural
law of the forum before which the foreign award is submitted and revealed by
such institutions as res iudicata and the limitation of appeals or means of setting
aside which can be raised against an already adjudicated matter, which must be
weighed against other policies and interests of theforum's legal order or specific
norms from which a denial of recogonition or enforcement would ensue.
After such weighing exercise is made, it should not surprise if it is
concluded that awards in international commercial and economic matters
which might have been set aside for public policy reasons if they had been
rendered in Argentina, are likely to be fully recognized and enforced in that
country because already enjoying res iudicataeffects abroad entitling the parties
to the arbitrated dispute to expectations as to their reciprocal rights and
obligations which would be radically and may be outrageously disturbed if the
award were deprived of extraterritorial effects. 45 This is why art. 517 (1) and (3)
Cpr. (to which internal renvoiis made by art. 519 bis Cpr. specifically referring to
recognition and enforcement of foreign awards) requires that for its recognition
and enforcement in Argentina the foreign award must have acquired res iudicata
and be considered as such under the law of the country where it was made.
These principles of predictability and repose 46 concerning situations
already adjudicated by final decisions will certainly induce the Argentine judge
to prudently consider public policy principles under Argentine law so as not to
unnecessarily disturb the expectations of the parties to an arbitral procedure and
the fluidity of international commercial and economic exchanges unless there
are superior national interests and policies underlying the Argentine relevant
norms and principles clearly overpowering the concerns for the stability of
international commercial arbitral adjudications.

45 A. T. von Mehren, AdjudicatoryJnrisdiction:Generaltheoriescomparedand evaluated,63 Boston
Univ. L. Rev., 279 & fol.

46The principle of repose canvasses different policies involved in the recognition and
enforcement of foreign adjudications, such as the avoidance of the duplication of efforts and the
preservation of stability and unity in the decision-making process by diminishing the possibilities of'
attacking existing adjudications (foreign or local) regarding specific issues. Such policies lead
within certain boundaries to sacrificing the principle of absolute correctness of the final decision,
which might be better served, for instance, by authorizing a total review of the foreign award by the
court where it is submitted for recognition and enforcement. As it has been sais in this regard, the
principle of repose: "... accepts the inherant imperfection of human knowledge and institutions and
the need to put to rest quarrels and disputes so that the energies of individuals and ressources of
society can be devoted to more constructive tasks.": von Mehren & Trautman: The Law of
Mnltistate Problems, 835, (196 5); 1983 mimeographed edition: v-4 & fol.
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